With US presidential politics now in a state of hyper flux, policy issues have become less important than personalities. I suspect that will change as the post-convention dust settles after the extraordinary chaos of July, underscored by the confluence of a violent assassination attempt and an incumbent baton-pass. In the meantime, the policy debate will most likely take a back seat to the ever-changing news flow.
Policy issues should come into sharper focus post-Labor Day. On the foreign policy front, I remain convinced that the US-China conflict will remain a major concern well beyond the November 2024 presidential election. Last week, I focused on the tariff issue, drawing attention to Donald Trump’s proposal to up the ante significantly on the trade war he started in 2018. In what follows, I focus on Trump’s latest views on Taiwan, long the most worrisome potential flashpoint in an era of US-China conflict escalation.
While it now seems like ancient history, Trump’s expansive June 25 interview with Bloomberg Business Week was especially newsworthy with respect to his views on US-Taiwan policy. He made the sharp distinction between Washington’s implicit pro-democracy support for Taiwan independence and what can be dubbed a more transactional approach. In Trump’s words, “I think, Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company.”
In other words, Trump is applying the same logic to Taiwan that he has used in the past with respect to Europe, NATO, and even Japan — that wealthy nations should be able to afford their own defense, especially if their military outlays as a share of GDP are below the 2% threshold that is now considered to be the minimally-acceptable international norm. If Taiwan wants US protection, he argues, it should pay an insurance premium for those “services.” Trump argues there can be little doubt that Taiwan can afford such a premium. Not only does it spend below the 2% minimum as the chart below indicates, but after all, Trump says, “They’re immensely wealthy … They took almost 100% of our chip industry.”
Never mind, as Chris Miller recounts in Chip War, that the US lost the competitive battle in semiconductors — first to Japan, then to Korea, and eventually to Taiwan — for problems largely of its own making. Trump cares less about blame and historical accuracy and more about seizing on Taiwan’s wherewithal to self-fund incremental defense assistance from the United States. Many MAGA Republicans, including the new nominee for vice president, JD Vance, have made a similar argument with respect to US military support for Ukraine. For what it’s worth, Taiwan wasn’t even mentioned in the recently released Republican Party Platform.
Needless to say, this transactional approach stands in sharp contrast to the values-based weapons support that has taken America’s Taiwan policy to the brink in recent years. Under the presumption that Xi Jinping is preparing China’s military for forceful reunification with Taiwan at some point in the next few years, a new bipartisan urgency has gripped Washington. Fueled by a strong pro-democracy message in the inaugural speech of Taiwan’s new President, Lai Ching-te, this past May, Republicans and Democrats, alike, have doubled down on their long standing support for US military assistance to Taiwan.
From, the PRC’s perspective, such actions inch ever closer to China’s most sacred red line, challenging Xi Jinping’s long standing insistence that, “The reunification of the motherland is a historical inevitability.” The Chinese leadership has viewed recent US support for Taiwan as pro-deterrence, taking dead aim on Chinese reunification intentions.
For Beijing, this is confrontational and provocative, providing ample justification for China’s recent counter moves. China was quick to launch “punishment military drills” in the Taiwan Strait following Lai’s inauguration. Moreover, in response to stepped up US security funding for Taiwan — congressional commitments of $2 billion annually over the 2023 to 2027 interval along with accelerated efforts to unclog backlogs of earlier weapons sales — China has also suspended arms control and nuclear proliferation talks with Washington.
And now Donald Trump weighs in with an entirely different approach. While I am not in favor of a transactional defense strategy that might usher in a new mercenary strain of US foreign policy, I have to concede that Trump’s tactics could represent the potential for a sharp break from Washington’s current values-based pro-democracy stance in support of Taiwan. The Trump insurance policy approach, by shifting the burden of deterrence from Washington to Taipei, may well reduce the direct tensions between the two superpowers
I would view this as a plus. I have been increasingly concerned about what I believe is Washington’s unnecessary aggression toward China. I argued in Accidental Conflict, that this is the case with respect to trade policy, industrial policy, tech policy, and a new strain of Sinophobia that is demonizing virtually all touch points between the two superpowers.
The “theory” of the book is that both sides are guilty of framing false perceptions of the other — distortions that are only superficially grounded in fact-based assertions. The confluence of these false narratives is the functional equivalent of the high-octane fuel of conflict escalation — a combustible mixture of misunderstanding, distrust, and paranoia that can be ignited by the slightest spark. Therein lies the danger of a cold war quickly turning into a kinetic military conflict.
There are plenty of possible sparks to consider, but Taiwan-PRC tensions are at the top of most lists. That is the repeated message from Xi Jinping as well as the inference that can be drawn from the US Congress and the Biden Administration. Nor is there any reason to conclude differently were Vice President Kamala Harris to prevail in the upcoming presidential election — a subject I will discuss in next week’s dispatch. By contrast, to the extent that Trump’s transactional approach with Taiwan neutralizes Washington’s pro-deterrence stance toward Taiwan and/ or the PRC, the risk of an accidental hot war would accordingly be reduced. That, in and of itself, would be a good thing.
Admittedly, this conclusion runs against the grain of virtually everything that is being said in the US about China today, especially the assertion that the Chinese military is poised to attack Taiwan in 2027. But like so much of the fearmongering that is now clouding the US-China debate, the evidence behind that assertion is murky at best. It appears to be largely based on an unsubstantiated assertion of Adm. (ret) Phil Davidson, former head of the US Indo-Pacific Command, in congressional testimony back of 2021. At the time, Davidson made vague reference to a six-year window of vulnerability to the possibility of forceful reunification of Taiwan and the PRC. Yet if you follow the “expert” testimony that has been presented to the House Select Committee on China, you would conclude that there is not the slightest shred of doubt to this unsubstantiated assertion.
I certainly don’t have a problem defending American values. That is most assuredly the case regarding Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. But our commitment to a one-China policy, as underscored by the so-called “six assurances” and “three communiques” that have long defined a hands-off US-Taiwan policy, makes an obvious and important distinction between Taiwan and Ukraine. In great-power conflicts driven by false narratives, we need to think more about de-escalation and re-engagement than escalation and confrontation. Trump’s transactional approach, however poorly conceived, may well be a means toward that end.
Next week: Kamala Harris and China